The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games.
Introduction
Satisficing is the core idea of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) . Unlike rationality theory, it does not presuppose well-behaved preferences and uniquely specified beliefs, but rather assumes some adequate mental model capturing the crucial structure of the decision environment. The basic idea of the satisficing approach is that people form aspirations, search for alternatives satisficing them, and adapt their aspirations in the light of experience. This framework for boundedly rational decision making conforms more to actual human behavior than the classical rational theory because it respects people's cognitive limitations by relying on ideas that are intuitively understandable.
Although the satisficing approach offers a natural "language" to explain the behavior of individuals and firms (Cyert and March, 1963) , it cannot easily be used to predict decision-making. Similar to the rational choice approach, where one cannot predict anything without presupposing specific preferences, it is impossible to predict satisficing choices when not knowing the aspirations.
Rather than following the tradition of revealed preference analysis and trying to infer aspirations from behavior, we rely on directly elicited payoff aspirations. Knowing people's aspirations, we can then formally define the conditions that must be fulfilled in order for a choice to be satisficing.
While in the portfolio choice experiments (reviewed by Güth, 2007) , and in the saving study by Güth, Levati and Ploner (2007) aspirations apply to different states of nature, in strategic interaction satisficing depends on what one expects about the competitors' behavior. The basic idea of our satisficing approach is that each player forms a conjecture about the others' behavior.
The conjecture of a particular player is potentially a set containing all the competitors' strategy constellations that the player considers as possible. We do not require the player to attach probabilities to the various elements in the conjecture. Therefore, the conjecture is non-probabilistic or prior-free. We will show how our notion of satisficing allows for prior-free optimality, i.e., for a 2 concept of optimality which is more basic than that required by expected utility maximization as it does not involve any prior.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of satisficing in normal form games. Section 3 describes experimental designs to test the satisficing hypothesis and optimality. Section 4 reviews some preliminary experimental findings, and Section 5 concludes.
Satisficing in normal form games
A normal form game with a finite set I of n ∈ N (n ≥ 2) players specifies, for each player i ∈ I, a finite set of strategies S i available to i, from which she can choose one strategy s i ∈ S i , and a payoff function u i (s) assigning payoff levels to i for all possible strategy profiles s ∈ Π i∈I S i .
While traditional game theory supposes that all players are rational and that rationality is common knowledge, our satisficing approach avoids these rationality requirements and assumes that each of the n players forms an idiosyncratic set-valued conjecture about the others' behavior. For each player i, let C i be the set of the others' strategy constellations that i considers as possible, i.e., ∅ = C i ⊆ S −i = Π j∈I\{i} S j , and let c i denote an element of this set. We do not require player i to attach probabilities to the various elements in her conjecture. If c i ∈ C i , this simply means that player i does not want to exclude the event c i = s −i = (s 1 , . . . , s i−1 , s i+1 , . . . , s n ) without necessarily being able to specify how likely the event is.
We further suppose that each player i forms a payoff aspiration for each
For a given aspiration profile
, by the number of player i's conjectures), denote the set of satisficing strategies by
In general, S i (A i ) can be (i) empty, meaning that the aspiration profile A i is too ambitious (i.e., there exists at least one conjecture c i ∈ C i such that
(ii) rather large, so that many strategies
, and whose optimality we discuss next.
Defining optimality in our context entails specifying what characterizes an optimal aspiration profile. Let A * i be one of player i's optimal aspiration profiles. Then the following two conditions must hold:
, A * i must allow for satisficing, and
, it must be impossible to satisfice a more ambitious aspiration profile.
) is non-empty and contains strategies s
allow player i to achieve no lower aspirations than those allowed by the strategies
, and for at least one c i allow her to achieve higher aspirations, then i might increase her aspirations for some constellation of conjectures without having to reduce any other aspiration. Thus, for any optimal A * i , the set S i (A * i ) must contain only strategies s * i for which it is impossible to find another strategy
In non-degenerate games where no two strategy profiles yield the same payoff for any of the n players, the set S i (A * i ) contains just one strategy s * i so that
In general, for each set-valued conjecture 
Experimental protocols to explore satisficing
In games as described in Section 2 (where we have abstracted from chance moves), an obvious protocol to explore satisficing is to ask each participant i not only to choose a strategy s i ∈ S i , but also to specify a set C i of the others' strategy constellations s −i that she considers as possible, and to form an aspiration profile
whose richness is bounded from above by the cardinality of C i , denoted by | C i |.
Eliciting aspirations but rewarding participants for their payoff function
Although we do not necessarily disqualify this procedure, we find it more appropriate to incentivize aspiration choices and will discuss some ways of paying for aspirations in the next section.
Checking if a given strategy s i ∈ S i is satisficing means checking if s i ∈ S i (A i ). One may be interested in observing how participants react when informed of whether their strategy is satisficing or not. The provided feedback may consist either in simply telling participants that their strategy is not satisficing or in informing them about the specific
for the strategy s i under consideration.
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Protocols may also vary depending on how free participants are in predicting their opponents' behavior. If the space of strategy profiles S = Π n i=1 S i contains only few elements and the number n of players is rather small, one may enforce
e., participants cannot exclude any possible constellation of others'
behavior. However, in games where S or n is large, bounded rationality requires C i to contain only a few elements. In this case, the experimenter may either impose an upper bound for | C i | or allow subjects to freely decide how many constellations of others' behavior they do not want to exclude.
Before describing some experimental studies on satisficing conducted so far, let us briefly indicate how we can capture the situation in which the payoff function u i (·) depends not only on the strategy profile s but also on chance moves z ∈ Z, where Z is finite. In line with our non-probabilistic approach to strategic interaction, rather than assuming cardinal utilities in the sense of
, with p(z) denoting the probability of z, we simply impose a set-valued conjecture about both the others' behavior and the chance moves. Thus, each idiosyncratic conjecture must now specify not only a constellation s −i of the others' behavior but also a chance result z ∈ Z. By this means, we can extend our notion of satisficing and prior-free optimality to strategic games in normal form involving chance moves, whose probabilities may or may not be known.
Experimental evidence

Study 1: testing the absorbability of satisficing in strategic settings
The first experiment (Berninghaus, Güth, Levati and Qiu, 2006) 
In this market, the symmetric equilibrium, given in general form by 
A total of four experimental sessions were run, each consisting of two subsequent phases with 12 periods each. Thirty-two students participated in each session in the random matching mode (or strangers design). To collect more than one independent observation per session, subjects were rematched within matching groups of 8 players, guaranteeing 4 independent observations per session and 16 independent observations in total.
The first experimental phase aimed at familiarizing participants with the concept of satisficing (so as to induce its absorption) as well as at investigating what is mostly revised by individuals (point conjectures, aspirations, or sales behavior) when requirement (2) does not hold. More specifically, in the first 12 periods, participants were forced, via a so-called "decision aid", to make 7 satisficing choices. After each seller participant had specified x i , c i and A i , it was checked by the software whether requirement (2) held. Each participant was then informed of whether or not her stated profit aspirations could be achieved in each state of nature. If this was not possible for some state, the participant had to go back and revise one or more components of her decisions.
Revisions were also allowed in case of compliance with (2), though.
In the second phase, aimed at testing the absorption of satisficing, seller participants were still informed of whether or not their sales strategy was satisficing, but they were free to choose their sales quantity.
To and just a few (11%) own sales choices. The observation that participants adapt mostly their aspiration levels when satisficing is not fulfilled also applies to the remaining 1044 observations, which are not immediately satisficing and, thus, must be revised. In the second phase, out of the 1368 observations that were informed to be not satisficing, 150 decide to revise some aspects of their decision. Also in phase 2, aspirations are revised more often (62% of the times) than one's own and conjectured sales. and satisficing choices are more frequent in the best state 3 than in the other two states. Thus, most participants comply with satisficing requirement (2) without being forced to do so, thereby suggesting that in market interaction the satisficing concept is absorbable.
Study 2: eliciting a set-valued conjecture about the others' behavior and testing for prior-free optimality
To investigate whether agents comply with prior-free optimality, Güth, Le- 
where π i (p i , c i ) are the profits i can attain given p i and c i .
Moreover, as participants were not required to specify a probability distribution over the set of conjectured prices, this setting allows for testing prior-free optimality. In particular, participants' choices are said to be prior-free optimal if they satisfy two testable conditions. The first condition is that the chosen 10 price must be rationalizable in the sense that it must be a best response to some price belonging to the convex combination of the minimum and maximum elements in the seller's conjecture. Price choices that cannot be rationalized by any probability distribution over C i are referred to as type 1-deviation from prior-free optimality. The second condition is that each specified aspiration must fully exhaust the profit potential allowed by the corresponding conjectured price and the chosen price, i.e., π i (p i , c i ) = A i (c i ) must hold for all c i in
Eighty-one students participated in three separated sessions, each consisting of 9 periods. New groups were randomly formed in each repetition (strangers design), with rematching within matching groups of 9 players so as to guarantee a total of 9 independent observations. In every period, each subject could rely on a software aided satisficing routine (the "decision aid") informing her of whether or not her price was satisficing. Irrespective of abidance by requirement (3), a participant could confirm her sales price or revise some aspects of her decisions.
A maximum of 5 revisions per period was warranted.
To incentivize all three tasks, in each period subjects could be paid according to realized profits, conjectures, or aspiration choices, with all three possibilities being equally likely. When payments were based on conjectured prices, the payoff of a seller participant was given by W i = 180 − 10× |p −i −c i |, with c i being i's closest conjecture to the actualp −i . When payments were based on aspirations, a participant earned her highest achieved aspiration, i.e., the
. If all the aspirations stated by the subject exceeded her actual profits, her earnings were nil.
The boxplots in Figure 3 provide descriptive statistics on the distributions of stated prices and average conjectured prices (i.e.,
) over all periods.
In both graphs, the × dots denote the means, and the horizontal lines indicate the theoretical equilibrium benchmarks.
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Figure 3 about here Although price choices converge to a value close to the noncooperative equilibrium benchmark (the mean price in the last period is 7.6), they are always lower. Play was, therefore, mostly out of equilibrium with seller participants being more competitive than predicted by equilibrium theory. Average conjectured prices increase over time too, but they are different from the equilibrium benchmark in all periods. Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics about the participants' satisficing behavior in each of the 9 experimental periods. The share of participants who immediately choose a satisficing price (i.e., who achieve all their aspirations at first attempt) increases over time. The share of those finally satisficing is above 96% in each period and is rather stable. Over all periods, the percentage of subjects undertaking at least one revision is quite low. Comparing rows iv. and v. reveals that the likelihood of revising depends on whether one chooses a satisficing price at first attempt or not. In particular, the propensity to revise is higher when aspirations cannot be immediately achieved. Finally, row vi. shows that, on average, those who revise engage in one revision (out of 5) in each period. Table 2 about here That people have difficulties in complying with prior-free optimality is shown in Table 3 , which presents (i) the percentage of subjects who set a price that cannot be rationalized by any probability distribution over C i (type 1-deviation from prior-free optimality), (ii) the percentage of subjects who choose a rationalizable price, but specify too moderate aspiration profiles (type 2-deviation from prior-free optimality), (iii) the percentage of subjects who meet both conditions for prior-free optimality, and (iv) for the satisficing subjects exhibiting a type 2-(but not a type 1-) deviation, the average unexhausted profit potential relative to the attainable profits, defined as . At the outset of the experiment, only 3.70% of the participants meet the two conditions for prior-free optimality, and this percentage increases to 11.11% in period 9. Finally, the average relative unexhausted profit potential of those who choose a rationalizable price is significantly different from zero in all periods, and it is rather stable over time. Thus, most participants fail to report a rationalizable price, and the decline in type 1-deviations does not lead to an increase in prior-free optimal choices because type 2-deviations become more frequent over time.
Conclusions
When applied to strategic games, satisficing depends on what one expects about the competitors' behavior. Therefore, to define satisficing in finite n-person games, we require player i to specify a set-valued conjecture about the others' strategy constellations, and to form a payoff aspiration for each element in her conjecture. Player i is then said to follow a satisficing mode of behavior if the strategy she chooses is satisficing in the sense that, for each element in her conjecture, the resulting payoff is not lower than the corresponding aspiration.
We adopt a non-probabilistic approach to strategic interaction, i.e., we do not require a player to attach probabilities to the various elements in her conjecture. This allows us to test optimality in a more basic sense than that required by expected utility maximization. More specifically, a feasible aspiration profile is said to be prior-free optimal if it is impossible to find another feasible aspiration profile that, for at least one conjecture, allows for a payoff improvement.
With the help of data from two oligopoly experiments it has been explored 13 (i) whether seller participants specify a satisficing strategy, (ii) what is mostly revised by participants (conjectures, aspirations, or sales choices) when their strategy is not satisficing, (iii) whether participants go on with satisficing after becoming aware of it, and (iv) whether they comply with prior-free optimality.
So far the results are partly encouraging. The overwhelming majority of subjects adapts profit-aspirations until they can be met. Most participants voluntarily maintain satisficing after having been familiarized with the concept, thereby revealing some absorbability of the satisficing approach. The percentage of seller participants who satisfice at the end of each period is always very high. However, many satisficing participants specify a too moderate aspiration profile: they forego some of the profits they could aspire to given their chosen price and their conjectured prices. While in the first experiment (Berninghaus et al., 2006) , this may be due to "safe" play by the participants, who wanted to guarantee themselves a positive outcome in case of payment based on aspirations, we are rather confident that this argument lacks relevance in the second study (Güth et al., 2008b) . In order to improve their chance of earning money, participants in this second experiment could report several conjectures and aspirations without having to forego profits resulting from their conjectured prices. The claim that, in this setting, participants did not play "safe" is supported by the observation that the increase in the number of conjectured prices is associated with a decrease in the dispersion of conjectures and aspirations.
Finally, many participants have great difficulties to generate prior-free optimal choices: overall, only 9.19% of the seller participants meet the conditions for prior-free optimality in experiment 2.
To conclude, our primary goals here were to generalize the concept of satisficing to strategic environments and to document some relevant experimental evidence on satisficing in market interaction. Understanding the reasons why satisficing individuals fail to meet prior-free optimality requirements may be an interesting future line of research.
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